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Abstract 
The empirical results of Saariluoma and Laine (in press) are discussed and their 
computer simulations are compared with CHREST, a computational model of 
perception, memory and learning in chess.  Mathematical functions such as power 
functions and logarithmic functions account for Saariluoma and Laine's (in press) 
correlation heuristic and for CHREST very well.  However, these functions fit human 
data well only with game positions, not with random positions.  As CHREST, which 
learns using spatial proximity, accounts for the human data as well as Saariluoma and 
Laine's (in press) correlation heuristic, their conclusion that frequency-based 
heuristics match the data better than proximity-based heuristics is questioned.  The 
idea of flat chunk organisation and its relation to retrieval structures is discussed.  In 
the conclusion, emphasis is given to the need for detailed empirical data, including 
information about chunk structure and types of errors, for discriminating between 
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Chunk hierarchies and retrieval structures:  
Comments on Saariluoma and Laine (in press) 
 
Saariluoma and Laine (in press) present interesting data on early learning in skill 
acquisition, and explore computational mechanisms allowing such learning.  They 
also make the theoretical proposal that chunks have a flat organisation that can be 
used as a retrieval structure, which contrasts with the hierarchical organisation 
typically used for that purpose in cognitive psychology.   
In this paper, I first comment on Saariluoma and Laine's experimental results and 
on their modelling experiments.  I then discuss their theoretical proposal of a flat 
organisation of chunks, and compare it with the organisation used by CHREST,1 a 
computational theory of chess expertise (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1993; 
Gobet & Simon, 1996b; in press).  Simulations with CHREST of the data presented 
by Saariluoma and Laine will be used to illustrate some of the differences between the 
two approaches. 
The Experimental Data 
While a great deal is known about learning in simple tasks (especially perceptual 
learning, cf.  Shiffrin, 1996) and about expertise in general, relatively little is known 
about learning at the early stages of expertise.  With chess, there is little more about 
this topic than the experiments carried out by Ericsson and Harris (1990) and Fisk and 
Lloyd (1988).  Therefore, the experiment described by Saariluoma and Laine, where 
two subjects were trained to improve their memory for briefly-presented chess 
positions, represents a welcome addition to the literature.   
                                                 
1CHREST stands for Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures. 
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Two main results may be singled out from this experiment.  First, with game 
positions, both subjects improved rapidly at the beginning, and then increasingly more 
slowly, a curve that is captured by logarithmic or power functions.2 Second, both 
subjects showed a slight increase in the recall of random positions.  Both results are 
predicted by theories explaining expertise by the regular acquisition of chunks (for the 
power law of learning, see Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981; for the use of logarithmic 
functions describing chunking-based learning and for the recall of random positions, 
see Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 1996b).   
Although these data are interesting, it is a pity that Saariluoma and Laine do not 
give more details about strategies, errors, or type of chunks replaced by the subjects, 
as was for example done in Chase and Ericsson's (1982) seminal research on digit-
span memory. Indeed, Ericsson and Harris' (1990) sister study on training a novice in  
recalling chess positions would at least suggest that Saariluoma and Laine's subjects 
did use some kind of explicit strategy during the learning phase.  Information about 
how well the positions in the training set were learnt would have been of interest as 
well.  Such details would have given more diagnostic power to the data, in particular 
with respect to modelling.   Another slight problem with the data is that both subjects 
had some knowledge of chess at the beginning of the experiment, which probably 
inflates the estimate of their recall performance.  However, despite these minor 
problems, the data are useful for exploring various learning mechanisms, which is 
how they are used by Saariluoma and Laine, or for testing the generality of an existing 
cognitive architecture, which is what I will do with CHREST later in this paper.   
                                                 
2Psychologists prefer to use power functions (y = a * xb, where b is typically < 1 and > -1) because 
they work well both in the case where y increases with x (e.g., percentage correct as a function of 
practice) and in cases where y decreases with x (e.g., reaction time as a function of practice). 
Logarithmic functions (y = a ± b * log [x]) work well in the first case, but are not plausible in the 
second case, because they do not reach asymptote (in our second example, a log function would predict 
negative reaction time!).  
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As noted above, both subjects improved their recall performance with random 
positions.  Indeed, it is of special interest that Saariluoma and Laine used random 
positions in their experiment, as recent work has shown that these positions do not 
simply constitute a control task, as was thought for a long time, but are highly 
discriminative for theories of expertise.   It is well known that Chase and Simon 
(1973a; 1973b) found that skill effects disappear with briefly-presented random 
positions, a result that led to an intriguing situation.  On the one hand, this finding has 
often been heralded as one of the most robust phenomena in expertise research (e.g., 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Gobet, 1993, Holding, 1985; Saariluoma, 1995).  On the 
other hand, some issues did not fit the puzzle quite so well.  For example, Chase and 
Simon found that "even in the randomised boards, players are noticing the same kinds 
of structures as those they perceive in the coherent positions, even though these 
structures occur rarely in randomised boards" (1973b, p.  232), which seems to 
suggest some kind of skill effect.  The presence of adventitious chunks in random 
positions has been noted by several authors  (Chase & Simon, 1973a; 1973b; 
Saariluoma, 1984, 1989; Simon & Barenfeld, 1973).   
It is only recently that the riddle was solved.  Gobet and Simon (1996a), 
combining the result of all published studies they could find on the recall of random 
chess positions, showed that there is a reliable skill effect, albeit a small one.  This 
effect, however, was not significant in most individual experiments, due to their lack 
of statistical power.  Gobet and Simon (1996a, 1996b) also showed that the chunking 
theory (Chase & Simon, 1973a, 1973b; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973) and related models 
predict such a (slight) skill superiority in random positions, because the presence of a 
large database of chunks makes it more likely to find at least a few chunks in a 
random position.  More recently, Gobet and Simon (in press) showed that CHREST 
makes accurate quantitative predictions on the recall of random positions, with 
presentation times spanning from one second to one minute.  The skill effect with 
random positions is theoretically important, because it is difficult to explain with 
theories based on high-level concepts, such as the theories proposed by Cooke et al.  
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(1993) and by Holding (1985).  Here, I certainly agree with Saariluoma and Laine that 
chunks play a key role in chess expertise, and probably in most other kinds of 
expertise. 
The Computer Simulations 
In their simulations, Saariluoma and Laine contrast two chunking heuristics.  First, 
a heuristic where chunks are built around a focal piece, using adjacent pieces (random 
neighbourhood heuristic).  Second, a heuristic based on the frequency of co-
occurrence and similarity of pieces, which is not constrained by spatial proximity 
(correlation heuristic).  The correlation heuristic fits the data reasonably well.  
However, a surprising feature of the simulations is that, with both game and random 
positions, the random neighbourhood heuristic actually gets worse as it learns 
additional chunks.  It is not really clear from the description of the heuristics given by 
Saariluoma and Laine why this should be so.  It is also unclear why the two versions 
differ at the beginning of the experiment, when no learning has taken place. 
As noted by Saariluoma and Laine, the correlation heuristic learns in a way 
reminiscent of neural nets.  A consequence is that it makes predictions about the kind 
of chunks learnt that differ from the predictions of the random neighbourhood 
heuristic as well as of the chunking theory and CHREST, which emphasise spatial 
proximity in learning.  What kinds of chunks chess players really learn could be tested 
in experiments where, for example, the type of chunks acquired by either method were 
flashed for a few seconds on a computer screen, and recall performance was assessed.   
 Saariluoma and Laine's goal was not really to run cognitive simulations, but to 
compare two learning methods.  Even so, in order to understand chunking in general, 
it is worth mentioning some features of their simulations which do not match the 
empirical data.  Contrary to the human data (Chi, 1978) there is no overlap between 
chunks.  Nor does the program make any errors.  Finally, the assumption that the 
program starts with a chunk for each combination of piece and square (a total of 768 
May 19, 2007  7 
chunks) leads to a recall which is too high with random positions at the beginning of 
learning.  While it is probably true that novices can distinguish different kinds of 
pieces on different squares, as argued by Saariluoma and Laine, it is unlikely that they 
can memorise them—which is what the program is doing. 
Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) showed that chunking mechanisms acquiring new 
chunks at a constant rate yield performance improvements that follow a power 
function, which Saariluoma and Laine prefer to refer to as a logarithmic function (as 
we shall see below, empirical data are often not powerful enough to tease the two 
functions apart).  Simulations with the correlation heuristic confirm Newell and 
Rosenbloom's analysis, as do simulations with CHREST (see below; see also Gobet & 
Simon, 1996b).  By contrast, the simulations with the random neighbourhood 
heuristic do not follow this pattern.  This is quite surprising, as Newell and 
Rosenbloom's analysis was done at a rather high level of abstraction, and would seem 
to cover a large class of chunking algorithms.  It is unclear from Saariluoma and 
Laine's description why this "anomaly" occurs.  Another departure from Newell and 
Rosenbloom's analysis is that the latter suggest that a single mechanism is enough for 
yielding negatively accelerating learning, while Saariluoma and Laine claim that 
several mechanisms are necessary (cf.  Saariluoma & Laine, p.  5). 
Chunk Hierarchies and Retrieval Structures 
The main theoretical contribution of Saariluoma and Laine's paper is their 
discussion of the organisation of chunks and its relation to retrieval structures.  
Models in the EPAM family organise chunks as a hierarchy, which develops 
dynamically as a function of learning (see Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984, or De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996, for details on the learning algorithms).  By contrast, Saariluoma and 
Laine propose a flat, modular organisation, which is similar to that used by most 
production systems (Newell & Simon, 1972).  Both representations are plausible (as 
many others), and it is unclear whether current empirical data can discriminate 
between them. 
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The next step taken by Saariluoma and Laine is intriguing, however.  They first 
define retrieval structure as meaning that "subjects have some pieces of knowledge in 
their immediate working memory and the rest of task-relevant information is stored 
into long-term memory [...]" (p.  8).  They then propose that "[the] retrieval structure 
is formed by a set of parallel and non-integrated patterns" and that "the contents of the 
patterns themselves cause the integration but no direct links combining patterns are 
required" (Saariluoma and Laine, in press, p.  8).  Before commenting on this 
proposal, it is necessary to briefly review how the concept of retrieval structure has 
been used in recent research. 
Retrieval structures have enjoyed great popularity in recent years as a means of 
accounting for (expert) memory in various domains.  However, one difficulty with 
this concept is that different authors use it with different meanings.  Chase and 
Ericsson (1982), who originated the term, give the following definition: "A retrieval 
structure is a long-term memory structure for indexing material in long-term memory.  
It can be used to store and order information, but is more versatile because it can 
allow direct retrieval of any identifiable location.  A good example of a retrieval 
structure is the mnemonic system known as the Method of Loci [...]" (p.  17).  Note 
the importance given to storing information, not only to retrieving it.  Chase and 
Ericsson also emphasise the hierarchical structure of retrieval structures and the fact 
that it takes a massive amount of practice to learn them. 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) use a similar definition: Retrieval structures are "a set 
of retrieval cues [that] are organized in a stable structure" (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995, 
p.  216; see also their Figure 1).  They also stress that, in addition to retrieval 
structures,  "knowledge-based associations relating units of encoded information to 
each other along with patterns and schemas [...]" (p.  221) are necessary for expert 
memory.   
Kintsch (1998, p.  74) proposes a model where "knowledge is represented as a 
network of propositions.  Such a network is called a knowledge net.  The nodes of the 
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net are propositions, schemas, frames, scripts, production rules [...]." Retrieval 
structures are defined within this framework: "[...] most nodes in a knowledge 
network are connected with powerful, stable links—retrieval structures—to other 
nodes in the net that can be brought into working memory" (p.  74).  Kintsch's 
definition is more encompassing than Ericsson and Kintsch's (1995), since it includes 
patterns and schemas, which are clearly treated separately by Ericsson and Kintsch 
from cue-based retrieval (retrieval structures), although the two types of encoding are 
supposed to interact (compare Figure 4 of Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995, with Figure 7.2 
of Kintsch, 1998).   
Like Chase and Ericsson (1982), Richman, Staszewski and Simon (1995) as well 
as Gobet and Simon (1996c; in press), who work in the EPAM tradition, emphasise 
that retrieval structures can store information swiftly and they have a hierarchical 
organisation.  For them, the key aspect of a retrieval structure is that it contains slots 
(variables) that allow values to be encoded rapidly.  They distinguish between 
structures acquired explicitly to meet the demands of the task (retrieval structure in the 
strict sense), for example by the subjects trained in the digit-span task, and structures 
acquired implicitly in the acquisition of expert knowledge, for example by chess 
players.  They call the latter structures "templates".  Both types of retrieval structure 
have been implemented as computer programs simulating expert memory in the digit-
span task and in chess respectively.  Note that these authors do not consider an index 
to long-term memory (LTM) such as the EPAM discrimination net as a retrieval 
structure, because it lacks the property of allowing rapid encoding.  In this respect, 
their use of the term is consistent with that of Chase and Ericsson (1982, p.  16-17).3 
                                                 
3
 Perhaps, some confusion could have been avoided about the concept of retrieval structure by 
using two terms, such as "storage structures" for structures allowing rapid storage and facilitating 
retrieval, and "retrieval structures" for structures only facilitating retrieval but not allowing rapid 
storage. Another source of confusion is that this concept is often used in a way that includes both the 
structure itself and the mechanisms associated with it.  
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As can be seen, Saariluoma and Laine's definition is clearly new: it does not 
include the ideas of rapid storage, of hierarchical organisation, and of linked nodes, 
present in all the sources just mentioned.  In a sense, it is even less restrictive than 
Kintsch's (1998) definition, which still provided structure through the links 
connecting nodes in semantic memory.  As noted by Saariluoma and Laine, it is 
probably too early to evaluate their framework, as more detail about the psychological 
mechanisms allowing information to be learnt and retrieved are lacking.  Perhaps the 
lack of a hierarchical structure is debatable, since, as we have just seen, it has often 
been emphasised in the literature on expertise.  In addition, the results of Freyhof, 
Gruber and Ziegler (1992), who asked chessplayers to partition positions at various 
levels of granularity, would seem to support a hierarchical organisation. 
Obviously, verbal arguments will not settle the question.  Saariluoma and Laine 
present computer simulations, and it is incumbent on theorists defending a different 
point of view to offer such simulations as well.  Fortunately, the template theory 
(Gobet & Simon, 1996c; in press) is implemented as a program, called CHREST,  
which incorporates both the idea of a hierarchical organisation of chunks and the 
concept of retrieval structure.  It is therefore possible to compare it in detail to the 
theoretical ideas advanced by Saariluoma and Laine. 
CHREST: A Computational Theory of Chess Expertise 
CHREST (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1993; Gobet & Simon, 1996b; in 
press) is a computational theory of chess expert perception, memory and learning.  It 
is inspired by Simon and Barenfeld's (1969) and Simon and Gilmartin's (1973) 
programs of perception and memory in chess.  CHREST consists of a short-term 
memory (STM), limited to four items, of a discrimination net, and of mechanisms 
directing eye movements and managing memory.  It acquires chunks (symbols 
denoting patterns of pieces on the board) by growing a discrimination net when 
scanning positions from a database of chess games.  The discrimination net provides a 
structure in which chunks are organised hierarchically.   
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Some of the large chunks evolve into more complex data structures, called 
templates, which contain a core (similar to chunks) and variable slots, where the 
information can be rapidly stored.  Templates are essentially schemata; the originality 
of CHREST is in providing mechanisms on how schemata can be learnt, how they 
relate to perceptual information, and in providing estimates of the time it takes to 
encode information into schemata.  A version of CHREST plays (weak) chess by pure 
pattern recognition, where recognised patterns elicit potential moves (Gobet & Jansen, 
1994). 
Eye movements play an important role in CHREST, as they determine the focus of 
attention, and attention in turn determines what will be learnt.  Six mechanisms 
potentially direct eye movements (De Groot & Gobet, p.  233-236): (a) LTM 
information; (b) perceptual salience; (c) lines of force (attack and defence); (d) 
random square in peripheral vision; (e) random piece in peripheral vision; and (f) 
heuristics aimed at gaining information from a part of the display that has not been 
fixated yet.  Given that some of these mechanisms are not specific to chess, 
Saariluoma and Laine's (in press, p.  16) statement that "the major simulation models . 
. . have an important presupposition: they use only chess specific relations, and these 
are their only heuristics (Simon and Gilmartin 1973, de Groot and Gobet 1996)" is 
simply incorrect. 
 The program accounts for a large amount of data, including the role of 
presentation time in the recall of game and random positions (Gobet & Simon, in 
press), the effect of mirror-image modification of the board (Gobet & Simon, 1996b), 
eye movements during the first 5 seconds of the presentation of a position (De Groot 
& Gobet, 1996), and the recall of multiple boards (Gobet, 1993).  Although most of 
the simulations have been done with the aim of explaining skilled behaviour, it seems 
worthwhile to see how well CHREST accounts for the data collected by Saariluoma 
and Laine on early learning.  In fact, it turns out that CHREST does this rather well. 
Methods 
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These simulations use the same version of CHREST as discussed by Gobet and 
Simon (in press); no parameter was altered in order to fit the data.  The only 
difference was that eye-movement heuristics based on relations of defence and attack 
were disabled (see Saariluoma & Laine, p. 7).4  To facilitate the comparison with 
Saariluoma and Laine's simulations, I followed their methodology : same database of 
positions; 500 positions in the learning set; tests after the study of 30, 60, 175, 220, 
270, 350 and 500 positions; 10 game and 10 random test positions, presented for 5 
seconds each; 20 independent runs.  The only differences were as follows.  First, 
advantage was taken of the fact that CHREST possesses detailed time parameters to 
carry out fine-grained simulations of the two human subjects, who studied each 
position for different amounts of time on average (roughly 3 minutes for NT and 5 
minutes for MQ).  One version of CHREST was allowed 3 minutes per position  
(CHREST-3), and another 5 minutes (CHREST-5).  Second, the program started with 
zero chunks, but with some knowledge of the board and the pieces.  With the recall 
tests at the beginning of the experiment, it was assumed that CHREST could 
memorise location, colour and type of piece in three different chunks, yielding a recall 
of one piece (cf.  Gobet & Simon, 1996b).  Third, only one estimate of STM capacity 
was used (three chunks).  In previous simulations, Gobet (1998) varied STM capacity 
with the recall of random positions and found that this capacity gave a good fit to 
human performance.  In addition, STM capacity has been estimated as about three 
items in domains other than chess (e.g., Zhang & Simon, 1985).  Interestingly, this 
capacity is close to that which gives the best results in Saariluoma and Laine's 
simulations (four).   
 
----------------------------- 
                                                 
4
 Actually, simulations using defence and attack heuristics lead to similar results as those presented 
here. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Results 
Figure 1 shows that CHREST-3 and CHREST-5 account for the human data very 
well with game positions and reasonably well with random positions.  Both human 
subjects do better at the beginning of the experiment than CHREST, which may be 
explained either by both having played some chess before the experiment or by a poor 
calibration of CHREST.  Table 1 shows that the simulations are well fitted both by a 
power and a logarithmic function.  The same applies to the human data with the recall 
of game positions.  As is often the case with learning curves, it is very hard to 
distinguish between logarithmic functions and power law functions.  Interestingly, the 
human data for the recall of random positions are not well captured by either function; 
Saariluoma and Laine propose a linear function to describe learning with the random 
positions, although a stepwise function would perhaps offer a better fit.  The sudden 
jump present with both human subjects may indicate a change in strategy  (Delaney, 
Reder, Staszewski & Ritter, 1998). 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of chunks acquired by CHREST-5 after one 
run (a total of 13808 chunks).  In this case, 708 templates were learnt.  One can see 
that CHREST predicts that humans learn a considerable number of chunks and 
templates during this task.  Recall performance remains modest (less than 45%), 
however, because the chunks and templates acquired are highly specialised and 
limited to the set of 500 positions learnt (in addition, these positions came from only 
67 different games).  By contrast, letting CHREST acquire about 10,000 chunks with 
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a larger sample of positions studied each for a shorter time, as was done by Gobet and 
Simon (in press), allows recall performance of about 60% correct.  It takes about 
300,000 chunks to reach master performance. 
 Although CHREST does not necessarily use chess-specific information to direct 
eye movements, the chunks it learns reflect the type of interpiece relations found by 
Chase and Simon (1973a; see also Gobet & Simon, 1998).  In particular, relations of 
colour are more frequent than relations of adjacency and sameness of kind, which in 
turn are more frequent than relations of defence.  Relations of attack are the rarest of 
all.   These properties emerge though the interaction of the learning environment 
(positions taken from actual games) and the chunking mechanism paying attention to 
spatial proximity.  Finally, as Saariluoma and Laine do not give details of the type of 
chunks their subjects acquire and of the kind of errors they make, no such analysis 
will be provided here.  Instead, the interested reader is referred to Gobet and Simon 
(in press).   
----------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Comparison with Saariluoma and Laine's Approach 
In this section, CHREST will be evaluated with respect to the four points 
addressed by Saariluoma and Laine in their introduction and in their discussion.  I will 
mostly limit the comparison to their correlation heuristic, as their random 
neighbourhood heuristic does not fit the human data very well. 
First, the characteristics of the learning curve.  Both CHREST and the correlation 
heuristic learn in a way that fits a negatively accelerating learning curve such as a 
power law or a logarithmic function.  The human data supports such a learning curve 
with game positions, but not with random positions.  Second, the nature of associative 
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links.  Saariluoma and Laine note that the heuristic based on frequency fits the data 
better than that based on proximity.  CHREST, which learns in a way that emphasises 
spatial proximity, does not support this conclusion, as it fits the human data at least as 
well as the correlation heuristic.  Obviously, frequency is also important with 
CHREST, since  patterns that recur often in the training set are learnt faster than rare 
patterns.  However, frequency is modulated by proximity in a way that is not achieved 
by the correlation heuristic.  As seen above, CHREST learns chunks that reflect the 
properties found in human chunks.  This is interesting in that relations of adjacency, 
colour, defence, and, more rarely, attack can be acquired with a learning algorithm 
that heeds only proximity (i.e., non-chess-specific information), assuming that the 
learning environment consists of coherent material.  It is unclear whether the 
correlation heuristic produces such a result.  At any rate, Saariluoma and Laine's claim 
about the superiority of the frequency heuristic is premature. 
Third, the size of working memory.  Previous simulations with CHREST have 
shown that a short-term memory capacity of three matches the human data well 
(Gobet, 1998; Gobet & Simon, in press), which is close to the number that gives the 
best fit in Saariluoma and Laine's simulations.  CHREST is also consistent with their 
view that chess players construct retrieval structures to expand working memory—
templates play that role.  Finally, the question of hierarchy in retrieval structures.  As 
noted above, Saariluoma and Laine's definition of retrieval structures would include 
the discrimination net used by CHREST and is therefore more inclusive than that of 
Simon, Richman, Staszewski and Gobet.  The idea of a flat organisation of chunks is 
of interest, although it is unclear whether current data could discriminate between this 
kind of organisation and a hierarchical organisation. 
Conclusion 
Several points of disagreement, some important, have been uncovered in this 
paper.  Some relate to methodological differences.  For example, I prefer using richer 
data, including errors and information about chunks, as well as convergent evidence 
May 19, 2007  16 
from various experiments, to evaluate computer models, while Saariluoma and Laine 
prefer comparing several learning methods on a single set of data (see Hyötyniemi & 
Saariluoma, 1998, or Laine, Hyötyniemi & Saariluoma, 1998, for a connectionist 
learning algorithm).  Others are more substantial, for example my view that the 
hierarchical organisation of retrieval structures is critical, compared with Saariluoma 
and Laine's emphasis on a flat organisation, and my disagreement that their 
simulations are diagnostic of the superiority of frequency-based chunking over 
proximity-based chunking. 
Although I have emphasised the differences between our approaches in this paper, 
it should be noted that they also share several similarities.  In particular, there is clear 
agreement about the importance of chunking, the necessity of investigating retrieval 
structures, the strength of modelling for studying human cognition, and the need for 
theories of learning, including constructivist theories, to be formulated clearly and 
precisely, if possible as computer programs.  It is unfortunately all too often the case 
that key concepts in psychology, such as "schema" and, as was shown here, "retrieval 
structure",  evolve multiple meanings due to the flexibility offered by informal 
theorising.   Even if they diverge on several points, our approaches to modelling at 
least offer the rigour necessary for elucidating these concepts.   
May 19, 2007  17 
Reference list 
 
Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A.  (1982).  Skill and working memory.  In G. H. Bower 
(Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, (Vol. 16, ).  New York: 
Academic Press. 
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A.  (1973a).  Perception in chess.  Cognitive Psychology, 
4, 55-81. 
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A.  (1973b).  The mind's eye in chess.  In W. G.  Chase 
(Ed.), Visual information processing.  New York: Academic Press.   
Chi, M. T. H.  (1978).  Knowledge structures and memory development.  In R. S.  
Siegler (Ed.), Children's thinking: What develops? Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Cooke, N. J., Atlas, R. S., Lane, D. M., & Berger, R. C.  (1993).  Role of high-level 
knowledge in memory for chess positions.  American Journal of Psychology, 106, 
321-351. 
de Groot, A. D., & Gobet, F.  (1996).  Perception and memory in chess.  Heuristics of 
the professional eye.  Assen: Van Gorcum. 
Delaney, P. F., Reder, L. M., Staszewski, J. J., & Ritter, F. E.  (1998).  The strategy 
specific nature of improvement:  The power law applies by strategy within task.  
Psychological Science, 9, 1-8. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Harris, M. S.  (1990).  Expert chess memory without chess 
knowledge.  A training study.  Paper presented at the 31st Annual Meeting of the 
Psychonomic Society, New Orleans, LA. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W.  (1995).  Long-term working memory.  Psychological 
Review, 102, 211-245. 
Feigenbaum, E. A., & Simon, H. A.  (1984).  EPAM-like models of recognition and 
learning.  Cognitive Science, 8, 305-336. 
Freyhoff, H., Gruber, H., & Ziegler, A.  (1992).  Expertise and Hierarchical 
knowledge representation in chess.  Psychological Research, 54, 32-37. 
Fisk, A. W.  & Lloyd, S. J.  (1988).  The role of stimulus to role consistency in 
learning rapid application of spatial rules.  Human Factors, 30, 35-49. 
May 19, 2007  18 
Gobet, F.  (1993).  A computer model of chess memory.  Proceedings of 15th Annual 
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society  (pp. 463-468).  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Gobet, F.  (1998).  Memory for the meaningless: How chunks help.  Proceedings of 
the 20th Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.  (pp.  398-403).  Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Gobet, F., & Jansen, P.  (1994).  Towards a chess program based on a model of 
human memory.  In H. J.  van den Herik, I. S.  Herschberg, & J. E.  Uiterwijk 
(Eds.), Advances in Computer Chess 7.  Maastricht: University of Limburg Press. 
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A.  (1996a).  Recall of rapidly presented random chess 
positions is a function of skill.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 159-163. 
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A.  (1996b).  Recall of random and distorted positions: 
Implications for the theory of expertise.  Memory & Cognition, 24, 493-503. 
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A.  (1996c).  Templates in chess memory: A mechanism for 
recalling several boards.  Cognitive Psychology, 31, 1-40. 
Gobet, F.  & Simon, H. A.  (1998).  Expert chess memory: Revisiting the chunking 
hypothesis.  Memory, 6, 225-255. 
Gobet, F.  & Simon, H. A.  (in press).  Five seconds or sixty? Presentation time in 
expert memory.  Cognitive Science. 
Holding, D. H.  (1985).  The psychology of chess skill.  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Hyötyniemi, H., & Saariluoma, P.  (1998).  Simulating chess players' recall: How 
many chunks and what kind can they be? Proceedings of the Second European 
Conference on Cognitive Modelling (p. 195-196).  Nottingham: University Press. 
Kintsch, W.  (1998).  Comprehension.  A paradigm for cognition.  Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Laine, T., Hyötyniemi, H., & Saariluoma, P.  (1998).  Foundations of simulative 
theorizing.  Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(p. 109-113).  London: Wiley. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A.  (1972).  Human problem solving.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
May 19, 2007  19 
Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S.  (1981).  Mechanisms of skill acquisition and law of 
practice.  In J. R.  Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skill and their acquisition.  Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Richman, H. B., Staszewski, J. J., & Simon, H. A.  (1995).  Simulation of expert 
memory with EPAM IV.  Psychological Review, 102, 305-330. 
Saariluoma, P.  (1984).  Coding problem spaces in chess: A psychological study.  
Turku: Societas Scientiarum Fennica. 
Saariluoma, P.  (1989).  Chess players' recall of auditorily presented chess positions.  
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1, 309-320. 
Saariluoma, P.  (1995).  Chess players' thinking.  London: Routledge. 
Saariluoma, P.  & Laine, T.  (in press).  Novice construction of chess memory.  
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. 
Shiffrin, R. M.  (1996).  Laboratory experimentation on the genesis of expertise.  In K. 
A.  Ericsson (Ed.), The Road to Excellence.  Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Simon, H. A., & Barenfeld, M.  (1969).  Information processing analysis of perceptual 
processes in problem solving.  Psychological Review, 76, 473-483. 
Simon, H. A., & Gilmartin, K. J.  (1973).  A simulation of memory for chess po-
sitions.  Cognitive Psychology, 5, 29-46. 
Zhang, G., & Simon, H. A.  (1985).  STM capacity for Chinese words and idioms: 
Chunking and acoustical loop hypothesis.  Memory and Cognition, 13, 193-201. 
 
 
May 19, 2007  20 
 
Table 1 
Amount of variance accounted for by a logarithmic function (y = a + log [x]) and a 
power function (y = a * xb) in Saariluoma and Laine's data and in CHREST 
simulations. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 Function 
                    ---------------------------------------------- 
Data source               Logarithmic          Power 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
NT, game    0.782   0.811 
NT, random   0.475   0.438 
CHREST-3, game  0.988   0.980 
CHREST-3, random  0.936   0.935 
 
MQ, game   0.948   0.949 
MQ, random   0.477   0.417 
CHREST-5, game  0.993   0.989 
CHREST-5, random  0.922   0.925 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1.   Percentage correct as a function of the number of positions studied.  Upper 
panel: results for NT and for CHREST with a study time of 3 minutes per position.  
Lower panel: results for MQ and for CHREST with a study time of 5 minutes per 
position. 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of chunks acquired by CHREST after 500 positions, with a 
study time of 5 minutes per position.
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